Michelle A. Lawless
The Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC
161 N. Clark St. Suite 1700 Chicago, Illinois
Telephone: (312) 741-1092
www.malfamilylaw.com; michelle@malfamilylaw.com.

Second District holds post-judgment motion to modify parenting time should be evaluated under a change circumstances standard, not substantial change in circumstances. In a post-judgment action, father filed a petition for increased parenting time only (not a change in decision-making), based on certain changes including the children’s increased ages and his transition to full-time remote work and argued for increased parenting time.  At the end of a lengthy multi-day hearing, mothermovedfor a directed finding arguing father had not proven a substantial change in circumstances which the trial court granted. The Second District vacated and remanded the matter holding that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard under section 610.5 of the IMDMA. When a party seeks only a modification of parenting time, section 610.5(a) which references a change in circumstances standard applies, not section 610.5(c) which references a substantial change in circumstances. Father needed to show only changed circumstances to move to the next question, which was whether a modification was in the best interest of the children. In its ruling the Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the plain language of 610.5(a) and 610.5(c) and concluded that the statute’s language was not ambiguous, that the legislature intended to have different standards when modifying only parenting time separate and apart when a party requests a modification of decision-making or both parenting time and decision-making.  The Court relied on the reasoning in In re Marriage of Salbi, 2024 IL App (2d) 240322-U and rejected the analysis in In re Marriage of Trapkus, 022 IL App (3d) 190631.  The Court also cited to the 2017 amendments which included the following sentence in 610.5(a): “Parenting time may be modified at any time, without a showing of serious endangerment, upon a showing of changed circumstances that necessitates modification to serve the best interests of the children.” 750 ILCS 5/610.5(a).  Justic Birkett issued a lengthy dissenting opinion.Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2025 IL App (2d) 240028.
Reynolds v. Reynolds

Investigators performing investigative work on behalf of attorneys are entitled to the same absolute litigation privilege afforded attorneys. In a case of first impression, a target of a private investigation (an alleged paramour) filed a tort claim against a divorce litigant and a private detective hired by the divorce litigant’s counsel.  The claim was a three-count petition filed under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) alleging unauthorized intrusion into her private affairs, for public disclosure of private facts with the intention of causing severe emotional distress, and violation of the DPPA when the investigator ran a check on her license plate and disclosed private information contained in her motor vehicle records. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the target appealed.  The Appellate Court held that the absolute litigation privilege extended to the private investigator hired by the divorce litigant’s counsel. During the divorce case, wife’s counsel directed an investigative firm to run a license-plate check on a vehicle suspected to belong to husband’s girlfriend and then to prepare a background report to investigate a potential dissipation of assets claim. The report included identifying information which could be used to facilitate subpoenas and additional discovery. The litigation privilege extended beyond counsel and parties to investigators acting as agents of counsel, even absent a written engagement or payment, so long as the communications and conduct are pertinent to proposed or pending litigation.  Lewis v. Kalbhen, 2025 IL App (1st) 242110.
Lewis v. Kalbhen

Post-judgment child support modification upheld under UIFSA. In a parentage action where neither the mother or father resided in Illinois at the time of the entry of the original order for support or during the subsequent modification proceedings including the appeal, the interpretation of what constitutes “consent” to Illinois modifying a support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) was at  issue.  The original support order was entered well after the birth of the child in Harvey, Illinois in 2005.  Mother initiated proceedings in 2009 and a support order was entered in 2012. In 2015, the father filed a petition to modify support and determine arrears alleging he had no income.  In December 2015, the court held a hearing and issued three orders: (1) allowing a lawyer for mother to file an Appearance, granting mother time to file responses to certain motions, a discovery timeline, and set a file hearing for a date in March 2016; (2) temporarily reducing father’s child support; and (3) a uniform order for support in which the court found it had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter. The lawyer for mother never filed an Appearance and the case proceeded for two years with several continuances where neither mother or a lawyer on her behalf appeared.  In 2017, the trial court issued a permanent order for support in the amount of $265 per month. In 2023, six after the final modification order and after the minor child’s emancipation, mother filed a Section 2-1401 motion seeking to vacate the 2017 order on the grounds the court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order and that she did not receive any notice of any of the hearing, and therefore did not consent to its entry.  Father filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted and denied mother’s motion to vacate.  Mother appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed. Section 205 of UIFSA states that if Illinois is not the residence of the obligor, oblige, or the child, the parties need to consent in the record or in open court that Illinois may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its original support order. The Court rejected mother’s attempt to collaterally attack the order years later via section 2-1401, emphasizing that consent to jurisdiction under UIFSA is sufficient to confer continuing authority to modify child support even when Illinois is no longer the parties’ home state.  Mother’s attorney appeared at a 2015 modification hearing, did not object to jurisdiction, allowed the court to enter substantive temporary support orders, mother received and accepted reduced support for years, and later withdrew her argument challenging personal jurisdiction during the appeal process.  Collectively, these actions reinforced the conclusion that she consented to the entry of the order under section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA. Justice Howse issued a dissenting opinion. In re Parentage of Jade, 2025 IL App (1st) 241803.
In re Jade J